I want to talk about a view of objective truth which I've been thinking about for the last few decades. This view equates objectivity of truth with observer-independence.
This view of objective truth makes no assumptions about there existing an external reality which is to be the arbiter of truth or falsehood. You may want to invoke these as part of a causal explanation for observer agreement, but it's not necessary. As Laplace said, "Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là" (I have no need of that hypothesis).
There is a functional reason why we should be interested in objective truths, ie. those observer-independent truths, over others - these are the truths which allow us to share cognitive resources. If a claim is observer-independent among others, then it will probably work for me. If it only works for some other observers, then my expectation of it working for me will be lowered, all other things being equal.
Of course, this account of objective truth can (and probably should) be modelled in a Bayesian way ☺, but I want to keep this posting relatively compact.
Suppose I claim that I have an alien (not just visa-less, but extra-terrestrial as well) in my bathroom. Is this statement objectively true? If we send 20 person-off-the-street observers into my bathroom, one at a time, to have a look, and none see any such thing, then the objective truth of my claim will look rather weak. If they all report seeing a short, big-headed grey ectomorph with large eyes, then it must be objectively true. Because the observers all agree, affirmation of the claim appears independent of which observer takes a look.The truth of a claim is objective precisely to the extent that it is observer-independent.
This view of objective truth makes no assumptions about there existing an external reality which is to be the arbiter of truth or falsehood. You may want to invoke these as part of a causal explanation for observer agreement, but it's not necessary. As Laplace said, "Je n'avais pas besoin de cette hypothèse-là" (I have no need of that hypothesis).
There is a functional reason why we should be interested in objective truths, ie. those observer-independent truths, over others - these are the truths which allow us to share cognitive resources. If a claim is observer-independent among others, then it will probably work for me. If it only works for some other observers, then my expectation of it working for me will be lowered, all other things being equal.
Of course, this account of objective truth can (and probably should) be modelled in a Bayesian way ☺, but I want to keep this posting relatively compact.
No comments:
Post a Comment